SE Theoretische Philosophie: Automatic Action - Einzelansicht

We do a lot of things unthinkingly. Consider minimal routine actions such as taking a sip from your coffee cup, changing gear whilst driving and turning the light off before leaving a room. Or take extended habitual actions such as cleaning your teeth or walking to the tram stop. Consider, finally, skilled performances such as a tennis player’s returning a serve or a skier’s high-speed navigation of difficult terrain. All these things seem to be frequently, in the latter cases even necessarily, done without accompanying conscious thoughts. If actions, in contrast to mere reflexes, are generally explained in terms of the beliefs, desires and intentions that precede or accompany the behaviour, how are automatic actions – minimal routine actions, extended habitual actions and skilled performances – to be explained? Should we think of them as intentional? Are they under our control in the same sense as actions carried out on the basis of conscious deliberation? Does taking these cases seriously perhaps force us to re-think the way we understand action generally? In the seminar we will read a variety of philosophical texts, focussing in particular on these questions.

Bill Pollard, Habitual Actions, in: T. O’Connor, C. Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell 2013, 74-81.

B.A. LA GyGe: M5: SE Philosophie des Geistes; M10: SE Theoretische Philosophie
B.A. LA HRGe: M5: SE Philosophie des Geistes
LA GyGe (LPO 2003): M III: VK Philosophie der Person; VK Philosophie des Geistes; M III: Mensch und Person
B.A. (ab WS 2012/13): M5: SE   Philosophie des Geistes M10: SE Theoretische Philosophie
B.A. (PO 2009): M III: VK Philosophie der Person; VK Geist; M III: Mensch und Person