| Kommentar |
Suppose that Gary believes that it will be sunny tomorrow and Beth hopes that it will be sunny tomorrow. Gary’s belief and Beth’s hope have the same content: namely, that it will be sunny tomorrow. But what explains why Gary’s belief and Beth’s hope have this content, rather than, say, the content that it will rain tomorrow? More generally, what explains why our intentional attitudes – e.g., our beliefs, hopes, desires, and emotions – have the contents they have? This is the basic question that theories of mental content aim to answer. This course will introduce students to, and help them critically evaluate, the main rival theories of mental content in the contemporary literature. Topics to be discussed may include: interpretationist theories of mental content, causal-correlational theories, and teleosemantic theories; debates between content externalists and internalists; and debates between conceptualists and non-conceptualists concerning the contents of perceptions. |
| Literatur |
Suggested Background Reading:
Kim, J. (2011). Philosophy of Mind, 3rd Edition. Westview Press, Chapter 8. |
| Bemerkung |
B.A. LA GyGe: M5: SE Philosophie des Geistes; M10: SE Theoretische Philosophie
B.A. LA HRSGe: M5A/B: SE Philosophie des Geistes
B.A. Angewandte Philosophie: M5: SE Philosophie des Geistes; M10: SE Theoretische Philosophie
M.A. Philosophie: M 1a, 2a, 3a: SE Person und Geist
M.Ed. GyGe (ab WS 2014/15): M2; M8
M.Ed. HRSGe (ab WS 2014/15): M2 |
