Master-SE Moralphil./Angewandte Ethik/Pol. Phil.: Moral Realism - Einzelansicht

We all judge that some actions are morally right and others morally wrong. But are any of these judgments true, and, if so, what makes them true? Are moral facts (such as the fact that lying is morally wrong) natural facts (such as the fact that lying tends to undermine social stability)? Or are moral judgments, when they are true, made true by non-natural moral facts – facts that are not discoverable by empirical methods of inquiry? This course will examine the answers that moral realists give to questions like these. At a first pass, moral realism is the view that (A) there are moral facts, (B) moral judgments, when they are true, are true in virtue of the moral facts, and (C) the moral facts are what they are independently of what we happen to think about them.

This course will introduce students to, and help them critically evaluate, the main versions of moral realism in the contemporary literature. Topics to be discussed may include: naturalistic and non-naturalistic moral realism; and epistemological, metaphysical, psychological, and semantic challenges to moral realism.

Suggested Background Reading:

Miller, A. (2013). Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction, 2nd Edition. Polity Press.

B.A. LA GyGe:  M6: SE Metaethik; M11

B.A. LA HRSGe: M6A/6B: SE Metaethik

B.A. Angewandte Philosophie:  M6: SE Metaethik; M11

M.A. Philosophie:  M1c, 2c, 3c: SE Moralphilosophie, Angewandte Ethik

M.Ed. GyGe (ab WS 2014/15): M4; M10

M.Ed. HRSGe (ab WS 2014/15): M4