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It is common for philosophers to distinguish between motivating reasons and normative reasons. An agent’s motivating reasons are the reasons for which they perform actions. On a broader usage, ‘motivating reasons’ can also refer to the reasons for which an agent believes, feels, and intends. Normative reasons are facts that count in favour of certain responses. For example, the fact that taking regular exercise is healthy is a reason to take regular exercise. This course will examine recent work on motivating reasons and normative reasons, and in particular the relation between them. Questions to be discussed may include: How is it possible for agents to act for good reasons? Are normative reasons somehow reducible to motivating reasons? Is a fact a normative reason for an agent to φ only if it is possible for that agent to φ for that reason? If so, what implications does this constraint have for how normative reasons and motivating reasons are best understood?

Suggested Reading:

Howard, N. R., and Schroeder, M. (2024). The Fundamentals of Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

B.A. LA GyGe: M5; M6; M10; M11

B.A. LA HRSGe: M5A/B; M6A/B

B.A. Angewandte Philosophie: M5; M6; M10; M11

M.A. Philosophie: Ia, IIa, IIIa

M.Ed. GyGe: M2; M8

M.Ed. HRSGe: M2