Kommentar: |
One influential idea about rationality is that it is a matter of responding correctly to reasons, or having an attitude that is supported by your reasons. If you have most reason to work, for example, it is rational for you to intend to work tonight, and if you have decisive reason not to drink tonight, then it is irrational for you to intend to drink. It is, however, difficult to make this initially attractive idea precise. For example, what kind of reasons are relevant to our rationality? If the glass in front of you in fact contains petrol rather than gin and tonic, you have reason not to drink it, objectively speaking. Still, it is not irrational for you to drink it if you reasonably believe that the glass contains gin and tonic. So it does not seem to be objective reasons, but rather what are reasons from your own perspective, that are relevant to your rationality. But in what does your perspective consist? Does it consist in your evidence, or your beliefs (or some other mental states)? Moreover, how does this idea relate to another prominent aspect of rational assessment: internal coherence between attitudes? Does responding correctly to your reasons guarantee that your attitudes are internally coherent, or do the demands of reasons and the demands of coherence sometimes come into conflict? In this course, we will tackle these thorny issues surrounding rationality by critically examining Benjamin Kiesewetter’s answers to these questions.
This seminar will be taught in English, and will consist mainly in discussion on assigned readings. Active engagement with the texts and participation in class are essential. |